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WISCONSIN V. YODER: THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT-
FIRST AMENDMENT EXEMPTION FOR AMISH UNDER THE
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Jonas Yoder, Adin Yutzy and Wallace Miller were parents of school
children and members of the Amish religion, the former two belonging
to the Old Order Amish sect.' A Wisconsin trial court labeled them
criminals for their violation of a Wisconsin compulsory school attendance
law: 2 the offense was not sending their children to school beyond the
eighth grade and until age 16. Their refusal to comply was in consonance
with firm Amish beliefs that such action would cause the eternal damna-
tion of their offspring.:'
Although holding that the compulsory school law did interfere with
1. "The Amish as an independent sect were founded in 1693, near Erlenbach,
Bern, Switzerland. Jacob Ammann, a Swiss Anabaptist and a follower of Menno
Simons and the Mennonites, broke with his church in disagreement over what he
felt were unwarranted departures from traditional practices. The Amish, the fol-
lowers of Ammann, thus dedicated themselves to maintaining the old practices
and resisting any capitulation to the sin of worldliness." Note, The Right Not To Be
Modern Men: The Amish and Computsorv Education, 53 VA. L. REV. 925, 933
(1967). The usage of "Old Order Amish" is a later American development that
came into common usage as the forces of assimilation and change began to pene-
trate the small Amish communities. Those groups of Amish who kept their older
customs were simply designated by the more progressive as "The Old Order." They
are the most conservative and traditional of the several branches of the sect, num-
bering about fifty thousand children and adults in the United States. HOSTETLER,
AMISH SOCIETY 37 (1968).
2. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 40.77 (1966) provides in pertinent part: "(1) (a) un-
less the child has a legal excuse or has graduated from high school, any person
having under his control a child who is between the ages of 7 and 16 shall cause
such child to attend school regularly. . . . (5) Whoever violates this section . . .
may be fined not less than $5.00 nor more than $50.00 or imprisoned not more
than 3 months or both."
3. The most basic tenet of the Amish religion is separat'on from the world
which is commanded by the scripture, Romans (12:2): "Be not conformed to this
world, but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind that ye may prove what
is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God;" and II Corinthians (6:14):
"Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers; for what fellowship hath
righteousness with unrighteousness? And what communion hath light with dark-
ness?" According to Robert C. Casad in Compulsory Education and Individual
Rights, 5 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 55 (1967), to the Amish, these beliefs
"are not mere social philosophy: they are fundamental to the whole question of
their existence on earth." See also, Comment, The Amish and Compulsory School
Attendance: Recent Developments, 1971 WIS. L. REV. 832.
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the freedom of defendants to act in accordance with their sincere re-
ligious beliefs, the trial court concluded that the statute represented a
"reasonable and constitutional exercise of a governmental function of the
state."' 4 However, on appeal the Supreme Court of Wisconsin vindicated
the defendant-Amish and held that the free exercise clause allows the
practice or the exercise of religion which is binding in conscience. In a
unanimous ruling, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that deci-
sion and held that Amish people are exempt from state laws requiring
schooling beyond the eighth grade. Finding that compulsory formal ed-
ucation after the eighth grade would gravely endanger-if not destroy-
the free exercise of defendants' religious beliefs, the Court announced
that the state's interest in universal education is "by no means absolute to
the exclusion or subordination of all other interests." 5  The legitimate
free exercise claims of the Amish had finally become the law of the land.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
The significance of Yoder is that despite a state interest to the con-
trary, the Court, cognizant of the delicate existence of a unique religious
society, has determined that the free exercise clause allows such a sub-
culture to sever its ties from the large technological society surrounding
it, by granting it an exemption from those secular laws which may impede
the realization of its religious pursuits. Despite the needs of contempo-
rary industrial society, there is apparently room under the Constitution
for those religions whose tenets dictate that they not depart from the past.
The holding puts religion and conscience on a firmer constitutional ped-
estal and raises interesting implications for potential claims for exemption
by future religious groups.
The purpose of this note is to provide an historical analysis of the free
exercise clause with a particular focus on minority religious sects and the
bases for which they have and have not been granted exemptions. High-
lighting the principal religion cases, an attempt will be made to delineate
the clause's ambit of coverage in commanding exemptions from secular
laws, and to show that such exemptions are consistent with both the free
exercise and establishment clauses in that they are the logical and neces-
sary outgrowth of government neutrality.
The first major confrontation between religious exercise and secular
law took place in Reynolds v. United States6 where a Mormon was con-
4. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 433 (1971), 182 N.W.2d 539, 540
(1971), aff'd 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
5. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
6. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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victed of bigamy. Despite the defense that polygamy was a principal
tenet of defendant's religion, the Court determined that he had exceeded
the bounds of permissible religious activity. In distinguishing between
"religious beliefs" and "religious actions" the Court decided that while
the government could not properly interfere with the former, it may pre-
clude actions which pose a danger to society. According to the "belief-
action" dichotomy, Reynolds was perfectly free, under the free exercise
clause, to believe in all Mormon tenets, including polygamy, but could
not articulate those beliefs into the forbidden zone of action if that action
would seriously conflict with an important public interest. Thus while
laws
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.
[Otherwise government indulgence] . .. would . . . make the professed doctrines
of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect permit every citizen
to become a law unto himself.7
Therefore, despite the direct burden the law placed upon the free exer-
cise of Reynold's religion, his conduct was so repugnant to contemporary
moral standards that it justified the abolition of the religious practice.8
An early victory for free exercise took place in Pierce v. Society of Sis-
7. Id. at 166-67. The gist of the "belief-action" dichotomy is that religion
serves as no defense to a law which regulates what has been defined as "public ac-
tions." The analysis contemplates three basic realms of behavior: 1) pure belief,
which everyone would grant is private; 2) the realm of religious action which may
have public manifestations; 3) the realm of action which is clearly public. That
the law cannot trifle with the first realm is obvious. The problem, then, is to either
distinguish the latter two, or to provide principles to justify legal regulation of the
second. Religious action is action, the function of which is only to establish and
perpetuate a private meaning for the individual. Religious actions create results
whose effects are private, felt only by those who believe. These actions touch only
the world of ideas and as purely symbolic actions are distinguished from actions with
tangible, worldly consequences. Public action, on the other hand, is that which
affects others in ways not limited to their beliefs. By virtue of the existence of
public demands regarding tangible conduct beyond the world of beliefs, we have
activity in the public world. Weiss, Privilege, Posture, and Protection-"Religion"
In the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 608-09 (1964).
8. See Galanter, Religious Freedoms In The United States: A Turning Point?
1966 Wis. L. REV. 217, 234: "[F]reedom of religion has been held not to protect
those who deemed palm reading to be a religious practice against laws forbidding
commercial fortunetelling. [McMasters v. State, 21 Okla. Crim. 318, 207 Pac. 566(1922).] It has not availed against statutes prohibiting the handling of snakes in
religious services. [Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880 (1956).] Nor
can faith healers use religious liberty as a defense in prosecutions for the unlicensed
practice of medicine. [People v. Handzik, 410 Ill. 295, 102 N.E.2d 340 (1951),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952).] Nor has it protected religious performances
against statutes regulating noise. [State v. White, 64 N.H. 48, 5 Atl. 828 (1886)]
and obscenity, [Knowles v. U.S., 170 F. 409 (8th Cir. 1909),] or religious pre-
tensions against prosecutions for fraud. [Crane v. U.S., 259 F. 480 (9th Cir.
1919).]
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ters9 where an act requiring parents to send their children to public
schools was successfully challenged. The Court sustained the Society's
objection to the law notwithstanding the acknowledged legitimacy of com-
pulsory education laws. It said:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.1 0
Considering the multiple contributions of the parents, teachers, public and
parochial schools in the preparation of the child, the Court paid homage
to additional interests and did not base its decision exclusively upon re-
ligious considerations." But notwithstanding collateral economic consid-
erations, in finding that the act "unreasonably interferes with the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of chil-
dren under their control," '12 the Court acknowledged the right of parents
to send their children to religious schools. It was this right which Yoder
was to characterize as "an enduring American tradition."' 13
Although Pierce acknowledged certain parental and religious rights,
neither are absolute-they have been held to be subordinate to state reg-
ulations designed to protect children. In Prince v. Massachusetts14 the
Court sustained the conviction of the guardian of a nine-year old girl,
both members of the sect of the Jehovah's Witnesses, for violating the
Massachusetts Child Labor Law by permitting the girl to sell religious tracts
on the streets of Boston. Relying on the doctrine of parens patriae, the
Court held that the statute withstood both the free exercise and the equal
protection attacks. In articulating the nature and scope of this doctrine
the Court said:
• . . the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways. Its
authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the
child's course of conduct on religion or conscience.' 5
9. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
10. Id. at 535.
11. The decision, having been rendered before the religious freedom clause of
the first amendment was considered applicable to the states, was actually based on
the property right of the school under the fourteenth amendment due process
clause.
12. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
13. 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
14. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
15. Id. at 166. This sensitivity for the rights of the children was adopted by
Justice Douglas who dissented in part in Yoder. Realizing that the controversy
542 [Vol. XXII
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Clearly, the state is empowered to oversee the welfare of children, and
when necessary it may extricate them from the "harmful" upbringing of
their parents even when pursuant to religious goals. The State of Wis-
consin argued in Yoder, that Prince requires that the parens patriae doc-
trine be controlling in compulsory attendance cases, irrespective of free
exercise claims asserted by parents. 16  However, the Court distinguished
Prince on the grounds that it was particularly applicable to public safety
where there is a more compelling need for judicial intervention. 7
The first case to apply the free exercise clause to the states through the
fourteenth amendment on a strictly religious issue was Cantwell v. Con-
necticut.1 8 Here a Jehovah's Witness was convicted of breaching the
peace with a phonograph record, which he had played on the street to
publicize his disdain for organized religions. Since the Court found that
Cantwell's intention was to solicit money for "true" religion, it acknowl-
edged his right to freely exercise his religion and reversed his conviction.
The rationale of Cantwell provided a firm basis for the extension of free
exercise protection in prohibiting statutes which tended to curtail religious
activities. 19
encompasses a triangular relationship in which the interests of the children are an
integral part, he expressed a fear of parental invasion of the children's freedom of
thought in which the religious dogma of the parents would be imposed on them.
However, he would be apparently satisfied if the children were individually can-
vassed as to whether they had religious scruples against attending public school.
16. Petitioner alleges that the Wisconsin Supreme Court erroneously viewed
the case "as involving solely a parent's right of religious freedom to bring
up his children as he believes God dictates. The principal of parens patriae
as applied to minors in Prince v. Massachusetts, was reaffirmed in Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).... ".Brief for Petitioner at 24. Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
17. In fact, the scope of Prince was tempered by Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963). And the parens patriae doctrine was further undermined in In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), where the Court commented: ". . . its meaning is
murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance." Id. at 16.
18. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The case followed Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939), which invalidated an ordinance designed to prohibit the distribution of lit-
erature on the streets. The right to freely disseminate ideas was too revered to be
impinged because of a need to keep streets clean or because of a remote possibility
that fraudulent appeals might be made in the name of charity and religion. How-
ever, the Court did establish that the freedom to act, even when the action is in
accord with one's religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative restric-
tions. This "belief-action" distinction was to be much relied upon in subsequent
decisions. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
19. Among the ordinances which were to succumb to first amendment im-
peratives was an ordinance of Struthers, Ohio, which forbade knocking on the door
or ringing the doorbell of a residence in order to deliver a handbill. The goals of
preventing crime and assuring privacy in an industrial community where many
worked on night shifts, and had to obtain their sleep during the day, were held
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Government attempts to compel affirmation of repugnant beliefs have
met with even more judicial opposition via the free exercise clause. In
Board of Education v. Barnette,20 for example, a state statute required
public school children to salute the flag and pledge their allegiance to it;
children refusing to manifest these affirmations were penalized by expul-
sion and their parents were subject to punishment. The question pre-
sented to the Court was whether a ceremony touching matters of opinion
and political attitude may be imposed by official authority. In finding
that the application of the statute constituted violations of the first and
fourteenth amendments, the Court declared that the state would have
to find some alternative method of promoting national unity that did not
involve compulsory affirmations of beliefs. In speaking for the majority
Justice Jackson commented:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith there-
in.21
Upholding the defendants' right to refuse to salute, the Court reasoned
that the public standard invaded the character of their religion;2 2 that
their refusal would not have any negative effects upon others; 23 and more
specifically, the statute violated the establishment clause.
In the summer of 1961 the Supreme Court considered cases involving
the validity of Sunday Closing Laws. 24 The onus of these laws was most
insufficient to justify the ordinance in the case of handbills distributed on behalf of
Jehovah's Witnesses. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). Non-discrimina-
tory taxes on solicitation were deemed improper when imposed upon itinerants in
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) and upon sellers of religious books in
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
20. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
21. Id. at 642.
22. Defendants were Jehovah's Witnesses and adhered to the belief that saluting
is sacrilegious idolatry-the flag being a forbidden "image." In his dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Frankfurter lamented: "[tihe validity of secular laws cannot be mea-
ured by their conformity to religious doctrines." Id. at 654. The majority opinion
countered with a free speech balancing analysis and contended that what the action
called for lacked the character of public action in that it called for private dedication
rather than public participation. See Weiss, Privilege, Posture, and Protection-
"Religion" In The Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 609 (1964).
23. The potential effect of the exemption upon others is a key factor in the
balancing process used by courts. An exemption from a law requiring immunization
against a disease could adversely affect those coming in contact with the non-
immunized individual. In Yoder the Amish's history of 300 years of self-suffi-
ciency negates any argument that their failure to attend public school for an addi-
tional two years will make them wards of the state.
24. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
544 [Vol. XXII
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heavily borne by Sabbatarians and Orthodox Jews who were already ab-
staining from work on Saturdays in observance of their religious beliefs.
Barred from transacting business on an additional day they found them-
selves in a position of competitive disadvantage.
The major case in this area, representing a retreat from Barnette, was
Braunfeld v. Brown,2 5 in which appellants asserted a denial of free exer-
cise, effected through what was tantamount to a tax on religious practice.
The Court's answer was that the statute did not make unlawful any re-
ligious practice, but simply regulated a secular activity, which when ap-
plied to appellants, made the practice of their religious beliefs more ex-
pensive.26  Such an impact, moveover, did not inconvenience all members
of the Orthodox Jewish faith "but only those who believe it necessary to
work on Sunday." '27
Addressing itself to the severity of the impact of the laws, the Court
concluded that although they adversely affect free exercise, the effect is
merely indirect:
To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an
indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make un-
lawful the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of
the legislature. 28
Therefore, where a state enacts a general law designed to advance its sec-
U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Two
Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
25. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
26. Id. at 605. This is precisely what Justice Brennan thought was unconstitu-
tional about the law. In his dissent he focused on this as the key issue, i.e., whether
a state may put an individual to a choice between his business and his religion.
Finding that such a law prohibits the free exercise of religion, he stated: "This clog
upon the exercise of religion, this state-imposed burden on Orthodox Judaism, has
exactly the same economic effect as a tax levied upon the sale of religious litera-
ture." Id. at 613. Furthermore, he found no compelling state interest but instead
relied on the mere convenience of having everyone rest on the same day.
27. Id. at 606.
28. Id. at 607. In sustaining the Sunday Laws the Court nevertheless provided a
limitation on burdens on religious exercise. "By requiring attention to 'effects' as
well as purposes of the law, this standard implies that the Court will evaluate the
impact of the regulation upon the religious practice-something that it did not have
to do under a straight secular regulation rule where it was sufficient for the Court
to determine that the purpose or objective of the law was properly secular." Gal-
anter, Religious Freedoms In The United States: A Turning Point? 1966 Wis. L.
REv. 217, 239 n.142. "The 'no alternate means' requirement means that in every
such case it is not sufficient merely to determine the secular character of the regula-
tion, but that it is also necessary to ascertain the feasibility of alternate means of
regulation." Id. at 239. However, the Court rejected a one-day-in-seven
statute as inadequate to serve the state's ends. It also felt that granting exemptions
would cause an administrative burden and undermine the purpose of the statute.
19721
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ular goals, it is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance
unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not im-
pose such a burden. The alternatives, in Braunfeld, were held insuffi-
cient to achieve the state's purpose of bringing about a general day of rest.
In summarizing the analysis of Sunday Closing Laws, one commentator
highlights the three emerging propositions: (1) that Sunday Laws are
valid if they can be interpreted as directed to a nonreligious end, i.e. a
uniform day of rest and recreation; (2) that merchants who close their
businesses on Saturday need not be exempt from the Sunday closing re-
quirements; (3) that if an exemption is granted, this does not make the
legislation invalid as an establishment of religion.2 9
Just over two years after it decided the Sunday Closing Law cases the
Supreme Court spent what was perhaps its most eventful day regarding
religion cases. In Abington School District v. Schempp '0 the Court found
required Bible reading and the recital of the Lord's Prayer in public
school violative of the establishment clause. On the same day it pro-
ceeded to broaden the scope of protected activities under the free exercise
clause in Sherbert v. Verner.3 1
In the latter case, the Court reversed the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina's decision to deny unemployment compensation benefits to a Seventh
Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturdays. Finding that the de-
nial of such benefits by the state infringed upon the free exercise of ap-
pellant's religion, the Court departed from prior decisions, which had lim-
ited state action which constituted direct burdens on religion, and ex-
panded the scope of free exercise activities to include indirect burdens. The
Court also increased the burden on the state in justifying infringe-
ments on religious liberties.3 2  Sherbert is perhaps the most significant
case to articulate free exercise principles in that it lays out an analytical
framework from which the constitutionality of laws alleged to burden re-
ligion can be tested. Quoting from NAACP v. Button,:I' the Court imme-
29. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 14 (1964).
30. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
31. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See Galanter, Religious Freedoms In The United
States: A Turning Point? 1966 Wis. L. REV. 217, 241, where the author character-
izes Sherbert as "the dawn of a new day for religious freedom claims."
32. The Supreme Court had "for the first time struck down a measure as an
onerous though indirect burden." 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Note that the in-
creased burden of justification upon the state is akin to the "no alteinate mea s"
requirement articulated in Braunfeld. See supra note 28. See also Comment, The
Amish and Compulsory School Attendance: Recent Developments, 1971 Wis. L.
REV. 832.
33. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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diately set out the constitutional test which must be satisfied by state laws
affecting religious freedom: the law must be able to withstand constitu-
tional challenge because it
• . . represents no infringement by the State of . . . constitutional rights of free ex-
ercise; or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion
may be justified by a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within
the State's constitutional power to regulate .... ,,34 (emphasis added)
As to the variables entering the "compelling state interest" test the Court
said:
It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state
interest would suffice; in this highly constitutional area, "[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible limitation."3 5
In addition to the "paramount interest" standard, a consideration of
whether or not a less offensive form of regulation could be adopted is
cqually vital. Here the state's contention that the decision would lead to
unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work was
rejected for lack of documentation. Assuming arguendo the state's abil-
ity to show the drastic threat of a deluge of spurious claims, it would nev-
ertheless be obligated to show the unavailability of alternate forms of
regulation.
The utility of the Sherbert doctrine is evidenced by the subsequent
decisions which used its impetus to carve out exemptions from state laws.
The following year the Court remanded, in light of Sherbert, In re Jeni-
son,36 where the interest of the state in having a source of jurors was
claimed insufficient to deny an exemption for a juror who had a religious
aversion to judging others. In perhaps the most significant state deci-
sion in this area, the Supreme Court of California held that a statute
which made it illegal to possess peyote was an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on the religious freedom of Navajo Indians. 7  The salient feature
of that case was the centrality of importance attributed to the Navajos'
use of peyote as a sacramental symbol. So inherently essential was the
34. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
35. Id. at 406. Here the Court found that no compelling interest would justify
the forcing of appellant to choose between free exercise of her religion and unem-
ployment compensation. What apparently distinguishes Sherbert from the Sunday
Closing Law cases is the Court's belief that the administrative burden resulting
from exemptions from the law coupled with spurious cla'ms for such exemptions
would severely undermine the intent of the legislature and defeat its purpose, where-
as in Sherbert the state could easily allow an exemption from its unemployment
compensation policy without endangering the whole program. See Note, State Law
Imposing An Indirect Burden Upon The Free Excrcise of Religion, 11 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 423 (1964).
36. 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
37. People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964).
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smoking of peyote that the Navajos could simply not practice their re-
ligion in its absence. Acknowledging this as a sine qua non of defendant's
faith, while also noting the state's failure to show that claims of immunity
would preclude effective enforcement of the law, the court safeguarded
this ritual under the free exercise clause.38
The free exercise clause commanded further exemptions from com-
pulsory vaccination requirements for a parent who refused to subject his
child to such vaccinations at school,3 9 and for a woman on her deathbed
who refused a blood transfusion necessary to save her life.40  In the latter
of these state decisions the court found no "clear and present danger"
sufficient to enjoin the religious beliefs of the woman.
The Sherbert doctrine is of drastic importance to free exercise claim-
ants such as the Amish, who relied upon it as principal authority in
Yoder. Through the expert testimony at trial of Dr. John A. Hostetler,41
the Court learned that the basic tenet of the Amish faith is individual
salvation achieved through a church community separate from the
world.42  Since the Amish religion must of necessity pervade totally the
lives of its followers, the question of how long a child should attend a
formal school is a religious one within the context of Amish belief. The
Court was aware that the possible reluctance of Amish children to return
to their society after exposure to high school would inevitably result in
the extinction of the religion.
Having found an infringement on free exercise, the Court looked to
the second prong of the Sherbert analysis, i.e., whether an exemption for
the Amish would undermine the purpose of the Compulsory Attendance
Law. The state's interest in attaining an educated citizenry is a valid
38. This is parallel to the "centrality" of importance the Amish religion attri-
butes to separateness. Without the right to withdraw their children from public
school the Amish would suffer the plight of ultimate extinction.
39. State v. Miday, 263 N.C. 747, 140 S.E.2d 325 (1965).
40. In re Brook's Estate, 32 I11. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). The issue here
was whether the state has the right to subject a person to what he believes will
be eternal damnation.
41. Dr. Hostetler is co-author of CHILDREN IN AMIsH SOCIETY (1971), and
author of AMISH SOCIETY (1968).
42. Supra note 3. Since the sine qua non of spiritual salvation is separation
from the worldliness of contemporary society, high school attendance constitutes a
deterrent to salvation. Were Amish children to be subjected to the competition-
oriented value system typical of public education it would be virtually impossible
for them to return to the agrarian form of Amish life, which commands skills and
wisdom quite different from "worldly" society. See Casad, Compulsory High School
Attendance and the Old Order Amish: A Commentary on State v. Garber, 16 KAN.
L. REV. 423 (1968).
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one, but one which was not controverted by the Amish, who revere edu-
cation as a vital force in their own community. In the expert opinion of
Professor Donald Erickson, not only do "the Amish definitely provide for
their children what could be called an education" but "they do a better
job in this than most of the rest of us do."'43 The Amish child is exposed
to an emphasis on moral wisdom, on living life, and on achieving union
with God, providing an education in the finest sense of the word in a
"school without walls."
In recognizing the adequacy of Amish education for fulfilling its cul-
tural and economic needs, the Court opened free exercise protection to
include the articulation of religious principles in daily life. Regardless
of the magnitude of the state's interest in universal education, where such
fundamental rights as parental direction and religious freedom are in-
fringed upon, this interest must be weighed in a balancing process. A
state interest of sufficient magnitude would be necessary to override the
free exercise claim. Finding the religion clause to be more revered and
deeply embedded into our constitutional system than the countervailing
state interest, the Court said succinctly:
The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those in-
terests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion. We can accept it as settled, therefore, that
however strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no
means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests.44
The Supreme Court proclamations concerning the constitutionality of
tax exemptions for religious institutions also provided some rationale for
the decision in Yoder. The Court recently sustained such exemptions for
religious organizations as consistent with the religion clauses of the first
amendment. In Waltz v. Tax Comm'n.45 the Court held that consistent
with the doctrine of "benevolent neutrality" freedom from taxation was
not an establishment of religion, but instead a necessary measure to help
guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious belief. An interesting
principle which emerges from these exemption cases is the rationale that
in certain sensitive areas there can be no exercise of religion without a
government sponsored exemption from some threatening law. The unar-
ticulated premise is that government acquiescence is sometimes govern-
ment hostility. In Yoder, the premise is that exempting the Amish from
the compulsory education law is not an unconstitutional establishment,
43. Donald Erickson is a professor at the University of Chicago. Brief for
Respondents at 37. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
44. 406 U.S. at 215.
45. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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but rather an exercise of government neutrality designed to ensure that
the delicate existence of a tiny religion will not be erased.
Citing Sherbert, the Yoder Court said the following:
A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the con-
stitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free ex-
ercise of religion. . . . By preserving doctrinal flexibility and recognizing the need
for a sensible and realistic application of the Religion Clauses "we have been able to
chart a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while
avoiding any semblance of established religion. This is a tight rope and one we
have successfully traversed." 4 6
This concept of "benevolent neutrality" is poignantly developed by au-
thor Wilbur Katz, who illustrates that the purpose of provisions for pas-
toral care in the armed services, prisons and state hospitals is not to pro-
mote religion but "to avoid limiting religious freedom."'47  He interprets
the statement of author William Gorman, "no help unless no help would
be harm,"'48 to mean that the concern of protecting religious freedom is
not that protected by the Constitution from legislative restraint but the
concern for a wider discretion in which legislatures may insure accommo-
dation for religious belief as well as non-belief. Under this principle, the
state is a secular state, but a secular state which does not give preference
to secularism and is actively concerned for religious freedom. 4"1 Clearly,
this is the gist of Sherbert and Yoder.
In conclusion, the Yoder Court has added a dimension to thc first
amendment by setting aside an objectively legitimate state law so that
a religious people could follow the professed dictates of their con-
sciences. However, the facts of the case were confined to general educa-
tional requirements, and whether Yoder is authority for greater exemp-
46. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972), quoting from Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970).
47. Katz, supra note 29, at 21-22.
48. GORMAN, A CASE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS
34, 60 (1959).
49. See Comment, Religious Accomodation Under Sherbert v. Verner: The
Common Sense of the Matter, 10 VILL. L. REV. 337, 341-47 (1965), where the
author elaborates on the scope of the Court's position of "benevolent neutrality":
affirmative action is limited to the "removal of barriers, governmentally implaced,
which obstruct freedom of exercise. This is not granting the religion . . . a special
status but merely returning him (the religious practitioner) to the status he right-
fully possessed before his rights were abridged by government intervention." Id.
at 347. As Justice Douglas succinctly put it in Sherbert: "This case is resolvable
not in terms of what an individual can demand of government, but solely in terms
of what government may not do to an individual in violation of his religious scruples.
For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do
to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the govern-
ment." 374 U.S. at 412.
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tions in other areas of law is yet to be determined. It should be noted
that the Court was moved by the demonstrated sincerity of the Amish-
taking judicial notice of three centuries of Amish history, it found per-
suasive the accomplished self-sufficiency of Amish society, of which its
efficient educational system was an integral part. Whether such demon-
stration is the criterion for exemption is crucial; for the religious sects of
the future would otherwise be handicapped in their embryonic develop-
ment.C 0  Nevertheless, the Court clearly recognized that the rights of
conscience are firmly embedded in our constitutional framework.-'-
Marc H. Pullman
50. Clothing itself in the cloak of "religion" did not earn an exemption for the
Neo-American Church which allegedly could not worship without the use of psy-
chedelic drugs. United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968). That the
courts are not prone to excusing people from state laws merely because they assert a
religious standing was also apparent in Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th
Cir. 1967). But see Ball, Law and Religion In America: The New Picture, 16
CATHOLIC LAW. 3 (1970), where the author, who incidentally was the attorney for
the Amish in Yoder, suggests that the term "religion" is one of great latitude and
encompasses non-theistic religious groups. Relying upon Toracaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488 (1961) in which the Court specifically included secular humanism,
ethical culture, Buddhism and Taoism in its definition of religion, he anticipates
litigation on behalf of "LSD religions, snake cults and other off-beat groups" who
will seek protection under Yoder. Id. at 9-10.
51. Religion and conscience have traditionally occupied a revered position in the
American value structure as the consequence of being transfixed in a cultural heri-
tage rooted in the Old and New Testaments. Colonial attitudes paid homage to the
rights of conscience, and it was this climate, superimposed over the memories of re-
ligious persecution in England, which shaped the thoughts of Madison and Jefferson
who provided the principal impetus for the adoption of the first amendment. See
Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806 (1958). For a
contemporary analysis of the development of the concept of "religion" within the
parameters of the first amendment see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)
and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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